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Abstract Abstract
The paper at hand aimes at identifying the assumptions that lead to the results presented in
an article by Michael Macy and Yoshimichi Sato published in PNAS. In answer to a failed
replication, the authors provided the source code of their model and here the results of
carefully studying that code are presented. The main finding is that the simulation program
implements an assumption that is most probably an unwilling, unintended, and unwanted
implication of the code. This implied assumption is never mentioned in Macy and Sato's
article and if the authors wanted to program what they describe in their article then it is due
to a programming error. After introducing the reader to the discussion, data that stem from a
new replication based on the assumptions extracted from the source code is compared with
the results published in Macy and Sato's original article. The replicated results are sufficiently
similar to serve as a strong indicator that this new replication implements the same relevant
assumptions as the original model. Afterwards it is shown that a removal of the dubious
assumption leads to results that are dramatically different from those published in Macy and
Sato's PNAS article.
Replication, Social Dilemma Situations, Trust, Simulation Methodology, Cooperation
 Introduction  Introduction
In Will and Hegselmann (2008a) we reported to JASSS on how we failed to replicate the results
presented in Macy and Sato (2002). We considered several aspects of the model as causes of
our failure. The most plausible explanation we could find, was that we had missed the way in
which transaction costs were implemented. Lacking the opportunity to analyse the source
code of the model, we were not able to verify this conjecture. Shortly after the publication of
our paper, the authors' reply appeared in the same journal (Macy and Sato (2008)). No clear
answer on why our replication might have failed was given in this text (Will and Hegselmann
2008b) but Macy and Sato published their source code in answer to our article. In the present
text, I am presenting the insights I gained from studying the code carefully, trying to uncover
those assumptions of the original model that we got wrong in our replication.
Macy and Sato's model is quite appealing. It implements a social structure that distinguishes
between interactions in (a) more or less small groups of people that know each other
comparatively well and (b) usually larger groups of strangers. This is a structural scenario that
corresponds well to real-world interactions of people. The model predicts that social mobility,
as long as it is not extremely high, has a large positive effect on trust among strangers. In a






Sato's work is of some interest to scholars of simulation but it needs to be clarified what
assumptions lead to the published results.
In the following section a condensed overview of the assumptions that I extracted from the
source code of the model is provided. The main finding is that there is an exclusion of certain
agents from reinforcement learning that is most probably an unmeant, unintended, and
unwanted implication of the code. This implied assumption is never mentioned in Macy and
Sato (2002) and if the authors wanted to program what they describe in their article then it is
due to a programming error. The subsequent section compares data that stem from a new
replication based on these assumptions with the results published in Macy and Sato's PNAS
article. The replicated results are sufficiently similar to serve as a strong indicator that the
replication implements the same relevant assumptions as the original model. Afterwards I
provide data from simulations in which the seemingly unmeant exclusion of agents from
reinforcement learning mentioned above is repaired. This modified version leads to results
that are dramatically different from those published in Macy and Sato (2002).[1]
 Assumptions of the model in Macy and Sato (  Assumptions of the model in Macy and Sato (2002 2002) extracted from ) extracted from
the source code the source code
The following subsections give an overview of the assumptions that I extracted from the
source code provided in Macy and Sato (2008). They are ordered according to the sequence of
events in a simulation and each time step.
Initializing Initializing
We have 1000 agents i.
Agents are randomly distributed among N neighbourhoods n.
The number of neighbourhoods is varied in order to generate average neighbourhood
sizes Ns of 10, 20, ... , 90, 100. For this purpose, N is set to the integer part of
1000/Ns, i.e. takes on values of 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 25, 33, 50, 100.[2]
The agents' probabilities to enter the market (Pmarket(i), see 2.4), cooperate
(Pcooperate(i), see 2.6) and to check telltale signs of character when deciding on trust or
distrust (PcheckTTS(i), see 2.7) are set to a uniformly distributed random value between
0 and 1.
Moving Moving
In each time step, each agent moves to a randomly chosen neighbourhood (that is
different from his previous one) with a certain probability.
The probability to move is given by the exogenous parameter mobility rate and is varied
from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1.
Agents that moved are classified as newcomers until they interacted once in their
neighbourhood (and not on the market, see 2.4). This is very important since all
newcomers are strangers and agents may decide not the interact with strangers.
Entering the market Entering the market
Each agent enters the market with an agent-specific probability Pmarket(i).
Agents that entered the market are classified as strangers.
Newcomers that enter the market remain newcomers in the next round.
Newcomers that interact in the neighbourhood become neighbours.
Matching Matching
Agents that entered the market can only be matched with agents that chose to enter the
market as well.





own neighbourhood that did not enter the market.
We thus have N + 1 pools of agents from which matches are drawn randomly.
If and only if the number of agents in a pool is uneven then there remains one agent
that does not have partner in this pool.
Cooperation Cooperation
Each agent i decides to cooperate (in a possible prisoner's dilemma situation with her
partner, see 2.8) in the current time step with her agent-specific probability
Pcooperate(i).
Trust Trust
In Macy and Sato's model, to trust means to enter a prisoner's dilemma. Mutual trust is
needed for a PD. Whenever at least one agent does not trust, both agents receive an
"exit payoff" that is set to -0.2 (see 2.8). Agents have two strategies to decide on
whether or not they trust:
Agents that follow the parochial strategy distrust whenever their partner is a
stranger. Strangers are all agents that either entered the market or are newcomers
in local interaction (see 2.3, 2.4)). In local interactions with neighbours (agents
within their own partition that are not newcomers, see 2.4) they trust.
Agents that act according to the signal-reading strategy trust their partner j with
a probability that is given by the probability to cooperate, Pcooperate(j), of that
partner.[3]
Each agent i chooses the signal-reading strategy with her agent-specific probability
PcheckTTS(i) and the parochial strategy otherwise.
Payoffs Payoffs
Agents that remained without a partner during the matching procedure gain a payoff of
-0.2 (see 2.5).
Agents that do not trust or whose partner does not trust gain an "exit payoff" of -0.2.
Agents in matches of mutual trust play the prisoner's dilemma. Given their decisions on
cooperation (see 2.6) they end up with one of the following payoffs:[4]
T: 1 - 0.5 · O(n)
R: 0.7 - 0.5 · O(n)
P: -0.2
S: -0.5
O(n) represents the opportunity costs that agents pay for being restricted to a subset of
all agents. They are given by O(n) = 1 - (n-1) / (N - 1) where n is the size of the pool of
agents from which the respective match was drawn (see 2.5) and N is the total number
of agents.
Besides the payoff in each time step, the agents' cumulated payoff is tracked. The
cumulated payoff of agent i in time step t is the sum of all the payoffs that agent i
earned until the end of time step t. Note that there is no discount factor.
Learning Learning
There are two types of learning in the model: Social learning from a role model and
reinforcement learning based on the agents' own experience. Agents that do not have a
partner do not learn at all.
Social Learning Social Learning
In each neighbourhood the agent with the highest cumulated payoff serves as the role
model.







cumulated payoff is strictly smaller than that of the role model copy each of the role
model's propensities with a probability of 0.5,[5] i.e. for each of those agents
Pmarket(role model) is copied with a probability of 0.5,
Pcooperate(role model) is copied with a probability of 0.5,
and PcheckTTS(role model) is copied with a probability of 0.5
In case that the role model is a newcomer, there is no social learning in the respective
neighbourhood and time step.
Reinforcement Learning Reinforcement Learning
Agents that are a role model or whose cumulated payoff is equally high, change each of
their propensities, Pmarket(i), Pcooperate(i), PcheckTTS(i), according to
(2)
where Pa,t is the current probability of deciding in a certain way a, e.g. to defect, πa,t is
the payoff gained by that behaviour, e.g. -0.2 in mutual defection, and Pa,t+1 is the
probability to decide for the same action a in the next time step.[6]
If i is a newcomer then the probability to enter the market Pmarket(i) of an agent i is
never changed by reinforcement learning. (!!!) (!!!)
This last assumptions is never mentioned in Macy and Sato's paper though their central claim
crucially depends on it (see section 4.2). There is no obvious justification for it and -
assuming that the authors wanted to program what they describe in their article - the most
plausible diagnosis is, that it is an unmeant, unwantend and unintended consequence of
some lines of code: in short a programming error.
A look at the code shows us that the authors experimented with agents that have two
probabilities to enter the market: one in case of being newcomers and one if not.[7] Both of
these probabilities can change via reinforcement learning but not both during the same time
step since an agent can be either a newcomer or not but not both and only the respective
probability can be changed. To remove the assumption of two probabilities, the probability to
enter the market as a newcomer is set to the value of the probability for entering the market
as a neighbour after initialising the agents[8] and after each learning event.[9]
This causes a serious problem: For all agents that are newcomers and whose probability to
enter the market in case of being a newcomer was changed by reinforcement learning, this
probability will afterwards be overwritten by the (unchanged) probability of entering the
market in case of not being a newcomer. Thus for agents that are newcomers reinforcement
learning does not have any effect on their probability to enter the market.
At first sight, I did not expect this problem to have any substantial effect on the results of the
model. However, the results I present in section 4 tell a very different story.
 Successful replication  Successful replication
Using the following figures you can compare plots that stem from the replicated model based
on the assumptions described in section 2 with plots from the original paper.[10] Information
on the figures is given in the captions of Macy and Sato's figures. Note that each combination
of a mobility rate and a neighbourhood size was repeated 20 times.
When comparing the plots, one can easily see that the results from the replicated model
match those from the original model very well. Not only in qualitative but also in quantitative
terms they are very much the same. This indicates that it is very likely that the assumptions I
extracted from the source code match at least the relevant ones of those that wereimplemented by Macy and Sato. Anyhow, this is only an argument to the best explanation. It
might still be that there are other reasons for the good fit of the results but, in my opinion,
this is quite unlikely. Furthermore, the high degree of quantitative similarity indicates that 20
repetitions of each parameter combination are sufficient to control for random effects of the
model.
Figure 1 Figure 1. Plots of data from replicated (left) and original model (right).
Figure 2 Figure 2. Plots of data from replicated (left) and original model (right).
Figure 3 Figure 3. Plots of data from replicated (left) and original model (right).4.1 4.1
4.2 4.2
4.3 4.3
Figure 4 Figure 4. Plots of data from replicated (left) and original model (right).
Figure 5 Figure 5. Plots of data from replicated (left) and original model (right).
Modified assumptions Modified assumptions
Now, that I have good reason to believe that I uncovered the assumptions that lead to the
results in Macy and Sato (2002), I want to explore the effects of changing some of them. As
the implementation of the reinforcement learning seems to imply an assumption that is
implemented unintentionally, the most urgent issue to check is how the model reacts if this
problem is corrected. I therefore took the code of the successful replication and changed it
such that newcomers can learn by reinforcement learning on whether or not they should enter
the market as well. Afterwards exactly the experiments of Macy and Sato described in the
previous section were repeated.[11]
It turns out that after this seemingly small issue concerning the set of agents that might learn
from reinforcement learning is changed, the model behaves dramatically different. Figure 6
shows the most interesting plot. We can see that for small levels of mobility the plots that
show the indicators of market interaction over time are very similar in both cases. But for
rates of mobility above 0.4 the results become more different the larger the rate of mobility
gets. This is consistent with the modification of the code since the rate of mobility determines
the number of newcomers and what was changed was whether or not newcomers can learn
from reinforcement learning on whether they should enter the market.
The most important point is that trust in strangers does not increase with the rate of mobility.
Actually the level of trust in strangers remains below or near 0.2 for all levels of mobility. This
is very different from Macy and Sato's finding that for mobility rates between 0.1 and 0.9 the
expected level of trust in strangers grows (approximately) linearly from a level of 0.1 to
0.7.[12] Figure 7 shows us that there are actually some runs in which a high level of trust in
strangers was reached. However, (ignoring mobility rates 0 and 1) it does not look as if there5.1 5.1
5.2 5.2
is a correlation between the probability of high levels of trust and the rate of mobility.
Figure 6 Figure 6. Plots of data from "corrected" (left) and original model (right).
Figure 7 Figure 7. Plots of data from "corrected" (left) and original model (right).
Conclusion Conclusion
The previous sections suggest that the results presented in Macy and Sato (2002) stem from a
source code that implied an assumption the authors did not intend to implement. If the model
were robust against this assumption, everything would be fine. But it turns that the model
crucially depends on that assumption.
The results presented here account for the importance of replication. Computer programs
may imply assumptions we did not want to implement and this might even happen to the best
in social simulation. Rigourous replication can detect such problems and furthermore uncover
the assumptions that lead to published results. Thus replication is an important issue in the
field social simulation and it is good to see that there is an increasing number of publications
on replicating models.[13]
Notes Notes
1 Both implementations were written in FORTRAN and can be downloaded from http://pe.uni-
bayreuth.de/?coid=21&q=detail&mid=125. The download also contains the Mathematica
notebooks that were used to generate the plots presented in this paper.
2 This is a minor difference to our former repplication since in Will and Hegselmann (2008a)





we conducted 7 runs with 34 neighbourhoods and the remaining 13 with 33 instead of taking
33 neighbourhoods in all 20 repetitions.
3 This is equivalent to the signalling mechanism suggested in Will and Hegselmann (2008a).
4 I use the standard notation here: If one agents defects and the other cooperates, the
defector gains a payoff given by T(emptation) and the cooperator one given by S(ucker). In
case of mutual cooperation both gain the R(reward payoff) and if both defect they receive the
P(unishment) outcome.
5 In Will and Hegselmann (2008a) we assumed that newcomers can be role models.
6 In Will and Hegselmann (2008a) we assumed that all agents that have a partner learn either
by social or reinforcement learning and that both options are equally likely.
7 The variables are named "PropMktN" and "PropMktS" in the source code. Line 492 shows
their application.
8 Line 348 of the source code.
9 Line 753 of the source code. Here, you also find a note, that the distinction should be
eliminated.
10 Here is a description of what the values in the figures mean. The exact definition of each
value was extracted from the source code of Macy and Sato's model.
Is the share of agents that entered the market (see 2.4).
Of all agents that have a partner and entered the market, "Trust strangers"
gives the share that trust.
Is the mean value of all agents' probability to conduct the signal-reading
instead of the parochial strategy when deciding on trust or distrust (see 2.7).
Of all agents that have a partner, are newcomers, and interact in the
neighbourhood, "Trust newcomer" gives the share that trusts
Of all agents that have a partner, are not newcomers, and interact in the
neighbourhood, "Trust neighbours" gives the share that trusts
11Not only were the parameters the same but I also used the same random seeds to initialise
the model.
12Note that this modified model produces results that are not only different from those in
Macy and Sato's article but also from those of the very first replication in Will and Hegselmann
(2008a). Theses differences are mainly due to further differences concerning the learning
algorithm mentioned in footnotes [5] and [6]. The model's high sensitivity to small
modifications of the learning algorithm will be adressed in future work.
13See for example van de Rijt, Siegel and Macy (2009).
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